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The discussion of the adaptive landscape in the philosophical literature appears to 
be divided along the following lines.  On the one hand, some claim that the adaptive 
landscape is either “uninterpretable” or incoherent.  On the other hand, some argue that 
the adaptive landscape has been an important heuristic, or tool in the service of 
explaining, as well as proposing and testing hypotheses about evolutionary change.  This 
paper attempts to reconcile these two views. 
 










Evolution is an extremely complex process, involving many factors – the genetic 
constitution of populations, the changing environment, developmental patterns and 
processes in organisms, and the variety of interactions between all three.  In order to 
make progress in investigating such a complex process, biologists begin their 
investigations of the most difficult problems of evolution by developing models that are 
founded on idealizing assumptions.  Biologists have deployed a variety of idealized 
models, as well as metaphors and analogies in service of this aim.  The aim of this paper 
is to provide a historical overview of one such metaphor, the adaptive landscape 
metaphor.  A variety of historians and philosophers of biology have weighed in on the 
adaptive landscape metaphor. According to these authors, the landscape metaphor is 
“mathematically uninterpretable.” (Provine, 1986), a “valuable heuristic.” (Ruse, 1996), 
“…a theory evaluation heuristic for evaluating the dynamical behavior of population 
genetics models,” (Skipper, 2004), and according to two recent authors, “it may in the 
end be impossible to articulate the metaphor in a way that is both coherent and 
conceptually fruitful.” (Pigliucci & Kaplan, 2006)   
At first glance, all these views may seem at odds with one another. The aim here 
will be to show how the above views might be reconciled.  The metaphor will first be 
described, its history briefly reviewed, the key assumptions of the metaphor discussed, 
and finally, it will be shown how the above authors’ views are not so contradictory as it 




1 What is an adaptive landscape? 
 
The first published image of the landscape was in 1932, in a paper delivered at the 
Sixth International Congress of Genetics.  Wright, along with Haldane and Fisher, the 
founders of theoretical population genetics, were invited to convey to a non-mathematical 
audience some of the key elements of their views.  Wright’s landscape was meant to 
illustrate the argument(s) in a 1931 survey paper, which summarized the key elements of 
his “shifting balance” theory of evolution.  Wright’s shifting balance theory was his 
solution to the problem of adaptive evolution.  He envisioned a three-phase process, by 
which populations could climb from one less optimal adaptive peak to a higher adaptive 
peak on the fitness landscape.  A central background assumption of Wright’s was that 
most adaptations were products of many genes in combination, and that interactions 
between genes significantly constrain evolutionary change.  Epistasis, or genetic 
interaction, was, he thought, pervasive in most populations; most traits were due to many 
genes in combination, and so, most changes in these combinations would lead to an 
organism being less fit.  These assumptions were empirically founded on Wright’s early 
research on physiological genetics.  His work on path analysis, the diagrammatic 
representation of gene expression, grew out of research in the inheritance of coat color in 
guinea pigs, which was dependent upon many genes in interaction (see Provine, 1989).  
Wright was also influenced by research at the USDA on selection for desirable traits in 
agricultural species.  It seemed to Wright that selection as a mechanism of adaptive 
change would run up against certain limits.  Populations eventually get “stuck” at a 
suboptimal fitness (measured, in this case, by oil content in corn, for instance), change in 
which required novel evolutionary circumstances. Wright explains: 
 
The central problem of evolution as I see it is that of a mechanism by which the 
species may continually find its way from lower to higher peaks in such a field… 
there must be some trial and error mechanism on a grand scale by which the 
species may explore the region surrounding the small portion of the field which it 
occupies. (Wright, 1932, p. 358-59) 
 
This mechanism was Wright’s “shifting balance” process of evolution.  Evolution of 
populations to novel adaptive gene combinations required “shifts” across adaptive valleys 
viz. the three phase process of drift, inbreeding, intra- and inter-demic selection.  Three 
diagrams (Figure 1) represent different kinds of adaptive change; from left to right, D, E, 
and F represent the fates of small inbred populations, intermediate sized groups with less 
inbreeding, and division into semi-isolated groups, what he thought was the optimal for 
evolution. 
The three phases of shifting balance process of evolution were: 
Phase I: Random drift (or, sampling error) in small  populations allows an 
“exploration of the adaptive topography.” 
Phase II: Natural selection increases the frequency of favorable gene combinations 
found in phase I. 
Phase III: Interdemic selection (selection between groups), in which the groups 
characterized by the best gene combinations send out the most migrants, and 
eventually, export the most well-adapted gene combinations to the entire 
population.  
 
Wright was cautious about introducing this simplifying metaphor of evolutionary 
change.  He wrote that accurately representing the genetics of populations would require 
thousands of dimensions; the field of possible gene combinations, he thought, was vast 
(101000), so, representing the adaptive values of all these combinations could not possibly 
be accomplished in a two, or even three dimensional landscape (see Figure 2). These 
comments were in part a response to Fisher, who in correspondence with Wright, (1931) 
raised concerns about the adaptive landscape metaphor.  Wright, in reply, acknowledged 
that there was many dimensions along with selection could change the genetic 
composition of a population.  As Wright wrote, in response to Fisher: 
In regard to the theoretical point which you raised, I appreciate that with increase 
in the number of dimensions the chance that one might pass by a continuously 
upward path from one point to another increases…(letter to Fisher, 1931, cited in 
Provine (1986), p. 310) 
 
Nonetheless, Wright’s image quickly became hugely influential.  Dobzhansky used his 
two-dimensional image to picture the distribution of species in adaptive space.  He 
imagined that each species resided on a separate adaptive peak, separated by valleys of 
reproductive isolation: 
…Each living species may be thought of as occupying one of the available peaks 
in the field, of gene combinations. The adaptive valleys are deserted and empty. 
Furthermore, the adaptive peaks and valleys are not interspersed at random. 
"Adjacent" adaptive peaks are arranged in groups, which may be likened to 
mountain ranges in which the separate pinnacles are divided by relatively shallow 
notches. (Dobzhansky, 1951) 
 
Notice, Dobzhansky is shifting the application of Wright’s image to speak of whole 
species as opposed to individuals or populations as resting atop adaptive peaks. 
Dobzhansky had a significant influence on Ernst Mayr’s views on speciation, the 
origin of two or more species from a single common ancestor.  One of the key 
mechanisms of speciation, according to Mayr, was via founder effect, the isolation of a 
small “founder” population and the subsequent divergence of this population from its 
parent population. Mayr (1954) proposed that speciation frequently occurs when a small 
group of founders migrates to a new habitat or island. The “founder effect" model 
capitalized on the general belief in the importance of genetic drift popularized by Wright. 
The founder emigrants could only take a fraction of available genetic variation to their 
new home (genetic drift as in shifting balance phase I).  These genes would undergo a 
selection-driven "genetic revolution" or reorganization of the genome (as in phase II). 
Mayr believed that a genetic revolution took place, in part, because the new population 
was also exposed to unusual environmental conditions, yielding rapid divergence and 
speciation. 
However, Mayr’s grasp of the genetics underlying this process was dubious.  
Mayr spoke of the “unity of the genotype” as what made each species and population 
distinct, and characterized by its own distinct adaptations: 
Work in population and developmental genetics has shown… that the 
thinking of beanbag genetics is quite misleading.  To consider genes as 
independent units is meaningless from the physiological and evolutionary 
viewpoint.  Genes not only act… but also interact….It had long been known that a 
gene which adds to fitness in its normal genetic background may be deleterious or 
even lethal when placed on a different genetic background (Dobzhansky, 1937).  
Such a shift in the selective value of a gene is not an isolated phenomena… This 
interaction has been described,… in the statement: every character of an organism 
is affected by all genes and every gene affects all characters.  The result is a 
closely knit functional integration of the genotype.  With recombination 
producing in every generation new assortments of genes (new genotypes), which 
in turn have to form well-balanced and fully viable phenotypes, it is evident that 
the integration has to extend beyond the level of the individual.  There must be 
harmony among all the genes of which a local gene pool is composed.  This gives 
the local population its cohesion and makes it a significant level of interaction.  
Whatever phenotypic variation may be observed in a local population is not in 
conflict with this basic unity, because all the genotypes in a population are 
products of the same gene pool (Dobzhansky, 1951, 1955b). (Mayr, 1963, pp. 
263-4) 
 
  This view was influenced by Lerner’s Genetic Homeostasis, as well as 
Waddington’s views on genetic contributions to development (1955). Mayr was 
convinced that each gene interacts with every other gene in development.  While Mayr’s 
views on the extent of interaction may today seem an extreme view, this assumption was 
very much in the air at the time.  Citing Goldschmidt and Waddington, Mayr argued: 
 
It is obvious not only that such an interacting system is highly sensitive but also that 
it permits numerous feedbacks and systems of regulation.  The students of 
development have various terms for these regulatory powers, such as buffering, 
canalization, and developmental homeostasis.  These terms apply to models that help 
us to visualize the action of genes in the developmental process…. We refer to 
various textbooks and essays on epigenetics for further details on the physiology of 
differentiation of the tissues and organs in relation to gene action. (Goldschmidt, 
1955, Waddington, 1956a…) 
 
There appear to be many developmental mechanisms and canalizations that 
prevent gene substitutions from expressing themselves in the phenotype 
(Waddington, 1957).  This constancy of the genotype is by no means fully 
understood, but it is, no doubt, one aspect of the general phenomenon of the unity of 
the genotype. 
 
Mayr frequently shifts from a discussion of the integration of the genotype at the 
level of the organism to integration at the level of the entire population.  Mayr’s 
reasoning was as follows: if the genotype of individual organisms are functionally 
integrated in the sense that each gene interacts with all other genes in the construction of 
a phenotype, and genes are shared in a population via recombination, then it must be the 
case that the entire population shares genes that interact, as he says, “harmoniously”.  
Throughout his 1963 book, the “unity of the genotype” is sometimes is taken to refer to 
the genotype of a particular individual organism, and sometimes to the genotypic 
constitution of species.  Mayr slips fluidly between the two, as if the first implies the 
second as a matter of deductive logic.  
Mayr’s influential work on speciation, along with Dobzhansky’s important book 
on genetics and speciation, lead to the notion that speciation required some special 
process of traversing a valley of low fitness, a “genetic revolution.”  Founder effect and 
peak shifting thus became linked in the evolutionary literature.  One of the assumptions 
of much of the literature on speciation from the 1960s until as late as the 1980s was that 
if one could understand how peak shifting was possible, one could understand how 
founder effect worked at a genetic level.  Was this assumption justified?  Here are some 
of the key assumptions attendant upon this way of framing the problem: 
i. That populations are composed of individuals whose genes are highly 
“coadapted”. 
ii. That generating more fit gene combinations requires that a population pass 
through gene combinations of lower fitness. 
iii. That species in some sense rest “atop adaptive peaks,” due to the 
coadaptation of their collection of genes. 
iv. That speciation requires a “peak shift” and a “genetic revolution” – due 
primarily to drift, followed by the origin of new, more adaptive gene 
combinations. 
 
All of these assumptions were subsequently questioned in the biological literature.  
However, we should not fault Dobzhansky or Mayr alone for assuming these things to be 
so.  In part, Wright’s inconsistent use of the metaphor could have lead to some of the 
confusion. 
One source of the confusion is that Wright sometimes took the surface of the 
landscape to represent the field of gene combinations graded for adaptive value (the 
genotype model), and sometimes to represent the mean fitnesses of whole populations 
graded for adaptive value (population interpretation) (Skipper, 2004, Provine, 1986).  In 
other words, on one interpretation, we can think of the surface as representing the variety 
of possible gene combinations, and on another, we can think of the surface as 
representing the average fitnesses of whole populations, whatever this might mean.  
Wright imagined also that whole species rest atop adaptive peaks; where, the valleys in 
this case represented reproductive isolation.  Again, Wright assumed that these were all 
due to gene combinations of low fitness.  One can also represent the landscape as a 
surface of ecological niches where different species reside, or as representing the 
fitnesses of different phenotypes. 
Will Provine (1986) first pointed out that Wright’s use of the landscape concept 
was ambiguous and inconsistent.  He argued that, on the genotype interpretation, it is 
unclear what exactly the units along the axes are supposed to be.  Provine claims that the 
surface would have to be discontinuous.  And, further, Provine argued that it is 
impossible to translate the genotypic landscape into a surface representing the average 
fitness of whole populations.  He wrote: 
[Wright’s] construction does not in fact produce a continuous surface at all.  Each 
axis is simply a gene combination; there are no gradations along the axis.  There 
is no indication of what the units along the axis might be or where along the axis 
the gene combination should be placed…Thus …the most popular of all graphic 
representations of evolutionary biology in the 20th century, are meaningless. 
(Provine, 1986, p. 310) 
 
Provine is (partially) correct: For single genotypes, (see Figure 3), it is possible to 
translate a graphical representation of fitnesses for a single genotype and for a whole 
population of individuals.  However, the translation is more difficult if we consider more 
than one genotype. 
Consider the following example (Figure 4).  This is an image of what is called 
Dobzhansky-Muller incompatibility, where we have two genotypes that are fit in certain 
combinations but not in others.  This is a case where one can traverse the landscape along 
certain “ridges” but not others.  Figure 5 is an image of the fitness landscape for an actual 
empirical case of the same; based on actual genotype frequencies found in the field for a 
grasshopper with two kinds of chromosome.  In this image, there are two peaks 
represented by dense contour lines, and a saddle between them.  So, it is possible to 
translate from one or two loci to a fitness surface.  The problem becomes much more 
difficult, however, as we imagine many more loci in combination.   
It’s when we take the metaphor to higher and higher dimensions that some of the 
difficulties with Wright’s thinking become apparent. Wright makes a number of 
assumptions about the landscape: that it is static, that one can indirectly represent 
multiple dimensions adequately in two or three dimensions, or that its surface is “rugged” 
- I.e., he assumes that a 2 or 3D landscape is relevantly similar to a multidimensional 
landscape.1  The “rugged surface” represents how certain genes in combination yield high 
fitness, separated by “valleys” of gene combinations of lower fitnesses.  Are all these 
things true?  What happens if we consider larger numbers of genes in combination? 
Lewontin (1978) has pointed out that the environment does not remain fixed.  As 
populations of organisms change, they affect one another, and modify their environment, 
and the environment itself is, of course, constantly changing.  He suggested that we 
envision a “rubbery” landscape which organisms themselves modify over time.  And, if 
multiple alleles contribute to organismic fitness, the landscape will have many more than 
three dimensions; the fitness landscape is a hypercube. 
Sergei Gavrilets, in a series of papers and a recent book (2004) has expanded 
upon Fisher’s earlier criticism of Wright.  Starting with the observation that the 
dimensionality of “genotypic space” is on the order of millions, he argues that the 
metaphor of the rugged landscape will have to be adapted.  We ought to think of the 
landscape as a hyperspace, with many more than three dimensions.  Further, as we 
increase the number of dimensions of the landscape, thereby representing the large 
number of genes that contribute to fitness, there is a high probability that we will get a 
variety of ridges, which can be traversed.  Gavrilets calls these “nearly neutral” networks, 
                                                
1 Or, according to a reviewer: “when you collapse lots of dimensions into a few, you'd get a nearly 
continuous surface.”  Thanks for these comments. 
a contiguous set of sequences of genotypes possessing very nearly the same fitness.  They 
are contiguous in the sense that any two sequences in a set can be connected by a chain of 
one-step allele or sequence changes.  He developed what he calls a “Russian Roulette” 
model to illustrate this.  Consider a two-dimensional lattice (Figure 6); with squares 
painted black and white representing genotypes that are either viable (black) or inviable 
(white) (thus, “Russian Roulette”).  “p” is the proportion of black sites. As p exceeds a 
certain threshold, a neutral network extends through the system.  The percolation 
threshold decreases in genotype spaces of high dimensionality.  Gavrilets explains: 
As we increase the number of dimensions of the landscape, the probability of 
ridges connecting high fitness genotypes increases; I.e., there is a strong 
possibility that high-fitness genotypes form networks that extend throughout the 
genotype space (we can get substantial genetic divergence without going through 
adaptive valleys) (Gavrilets, 2004) 
 
There are a number of reasons one might question Gavrilets’ model.2  First, he 
still speaks of populations as occupying positions in the adaptive landscape; but what is 
meant by mean population fitness?  How ought we to measure this, and ought we to 
expect it to increase?  Indeed, if we take it to be the average rate of increase in population 
size, both Wright and Fisher knew that we should not expect it to increase.  Moreover, 
there’s no clear mapping of genotypic space to this notion of mean fitness.  Second, he 
substitutes one metaphor for another; what are the “ridges”?  What do they represent?  
And, how ought we to conceive of their connections between “peaks”? 
While all of these are legitimate and important questions, what is relevant to the 
more general question at issue is the following.  Gavrilets’ reconceptualization of the 
landscape (and earlier, Coyne, Orr and others’ discussions of “ridges” in the landscape) 
                                                
2 Thanks to a reviewer for these comments 
has lead many biologists to question some of Wright’s, and subsequently, Mayr’s 
presuppositions about genetic interaction and the limits it places on modes of speciation.  
Let’s return to Wright’s central background assumption: that evolution requires 
traversing adaptive valleys.  This assumption, along with the imagery of peak shifting as 
a means not only of adaptive change, but speciation, became an enormously influential 
one.  In particular, Wright’s image of the stable, co-evolved gene combinations yielding 
stable species and populations lead many researchers on speciation to equate the problem 
of speciation as the problem of peak shifting.  Was it a warranted assumption? 
Using both a one-locus, two-allele models, and multilocus models, theoretical 
biologists have been able to demonstrate that the probability of stochastic transitions 
between fitness peaks (peak shifting via drift) is very low.  Even for very small 
populations, with relatively shallow valleys, the chance of a peak shift via drift is very 
small.  This is because the chance of such a shift occurring decreases with population size 
and depth of valley, but the waiting time to a peak shift grows exponentially with the 
product of the population size and the depth of valley.   
Perhaps the most important objection to peak shift models is that the chances of 
such shifts are small and, even if they do occur, they yield only trivial 
reproductive isolation… the probability of a peak shift is proportional to the size 
of population and depth of valley… the deeper the valley, the smaller the chances 
of a peak shift…[and] the less gene flow there is.  The lesson is clear, while 
deeper valleys yield greater reproductive isolation, they are less likely to be 
crossed.” (Coyne and Orr, 2004, p. 395) 
 
In other words, the scenario Wright envisions in shifting balance is very implausible.  
Small populations are more likely to go extinct than to drift into the vicinity of a more 
adaptive peak. 
In short, the theoretical assumptions supporting the argument for founder effect, 
one of the most widely taught and well-known models of speciation, is flawed.  This is 
not to say that founder effect does not occur, it simply does not likely occur via the 
genetic mechanisms that Mayr imagined for it.  Looking back, Kimura remarked that the 
founders of the synthesis were perhaps overzealous; the claims about the genetics of 
adaptation and speciation were largely unsupported by empirical evidence. 
 
 Led by the Zeitgeist, a great deal was said about how gene pools of the 
species are organized and how they change in evolution.  However, these were 
inferences based on observations at the phenotypic level, and in reality, there was 
no way of actually knowing what is going on in evolution at the level of the 
internal structure of the gene.   As mentioned already, much importance was 
claimed for epistatic and heterotic gene interactions in fitness.  Such terms as 
integrated gene complex, genetic revolution, cohesion of the gene pool, as well as 
genetic homeostasis were introduced and accepted by some.  But, in my opinion, 
they were more rhetorical than scientific. (Kimura, 1983, p. 22)  
 
In another striking paper critiquing the adaptive landscape, P.A.P. Moran 
demonstrated that under a wide variety of circumstances, selection will not drive 
populations up adaptive peaks, indeed, it can sometimes drive populations down into 
valleys.  As mentioned above, the average fitness of a population (understood as rate of 
increase) can decrease rather than increase over time for any number of reasons; for 
instance, when fitnesses are frequency dependent. 
In sum, there are a variety of different complaints that one might raise about the 
adaptive landscape: 
1. The adaptive landscape, for both genotypes and whole populations, is not three-
dimensional, but multidimensional.  As one increases the number of dimensions, 
one of the central assumptions of Wright – that one cannot arrive at a higher 
adaptive peak without traversing a valley – turns out to be defeated.  That is, as 
the number of dimensions of the landscape increases, the number of ways one 
might traverse the landscape without lowering fitness increases substantially. 
2. The landscape is most likely not static; it changes in time, either because of 
changes in the environment, or changes in the actual genetic constitution of the 
population. 
3. As Moran pointed out in 1964, a population in the vicinity of an adaptive peak 
may not necessarily climb such a peak.  Average population fitness can decrease 
for any number of reasons.  Indeed, “populations do not in general tend to 
maximize their mean fitness if the latter is dependent on more than one locus” 
(Moran, 1964) (i.e., most of the time).  This challenges both Wright’s and Fisher’s 
views; for, Wright thought that in phase three, population in the vicinity of a new 
adaptive peak would necessarily climb that peak, and Fisher assumed much the 
same.  But Moran’s discussion challenges all this.  Both Fisher and Wright 
assumed that relative fitnesses depend upon a single variable (the frequency of 
certain alleles), and that they do not change in time.  But, average population 
fitness frequently depends upon more than one variable that changes in time, e.g.  
the case of frequency dependent genotypic fitness.  The fitness of a population is 
by no means directly related to the frequencies of various genes. 
 
In light of these objections, some biologists (e.g. Moran) have rejected the notion of 
adaptive landscapes, in particular, for representing population level change.  Others 
(Gavrilets, 2004), have reformed the concept to consider the possibility of multiple 
dimensions.  Provine writes that the landscape metaphor is “mathematically 
uninterpretable.” (Provine, 1986)  And, more recently, Pigliucci and Kaplan argue that “it 
may in the end be impossible to articulate the metaphor in a way that is both coherent and 
conceptually fruitful.” (Pigliucci & Kaplan, 2006)  On the other hand, Ruse (1990) argues 
that it was a “valuable heuristic.” (Ruse, 1996), and Skipper expands on Ruse, explaining 
that the landscape is “a theory evaluation heuristic for evaluating the dynamical behavior 
of population genetics models.” (Skipper, 2004)  May all these arguments be made 
consistent? 
 
2.  Models and Analogies in Science: Some Lost but not Forgotten History of Philosophy 
of Science: 
 
 What to make of these (apparently) divergent views?  I will argue here that there 
are grains of truth in all of them.  First, Provine, Kaplan and Pigliucci are correct (in 
part).  The landscape metaphor is founded on serious misconceptions.  However, if we 
take challenging the assumptions of the metaphor itself playing a role in theory 
evaluation, then Ruse and Skipper are correct.  These apparently competing 
interpretations of the metaphor are not irreconcilable. One key to understanding how and 
why these views can be reconciled can be found in the infrequently cited work of Mary 
Hesse.  (Hesse, 1966) 
Philosophers of science going back to Duhem have debated the use and abuse of 
metaphor and analogy in science.  Duhem, Braithwaite, Brodbeck, and Nagel all argued 
that the use of analogy in science had pernicious effects. Duhem wrote that only "Weak 
minds" such as those of the English require construction or visualization of a mechanical 
model; one must beware of confusing the model and the theory itself:  “The 
Englishman… finds the use of the model so necessary to the study of physics that to his 
mind the model ends up being confounded with the very understanding of the 
theory.”(Duhem, 1917, p. 71)    In contrast, Campbell, Hesse, Achinstein, Spector, and 
more recently, Morrison and Morgan, have argued that analogies and metaphor have been 
central to prediction and explanation.  
Hesse’s classic (1966) book is an imagined dialogue between a Duhemian and a 
Campbellian.  We might imagine Provine and Kaplan and Piglucci as Duhemians, and 
Skipper and Ruse as Campbellians in the exchange over the adaptive landscape.  
According to Duhem, mechanical models may play at best a meager and problematic role 
in the progress of physics.  Duhem's view did not go unchallenged.  In Physics, the 
Elements, Campbell comes to the defense of the British.  He argues that analogies are not 
mere aids to theory construction, but are essential to explanation and prediction.   
Campbell's argument is the following. He took theories to consist in a set of 
propositions divided into two groups.  The first set of propositions, the "hypotheses" are 
statements incapable of proof or disproof by themselves, or, usually mathematical 
assumptions simply "defined by postulate."  For instance, the sentences "x, y, and z are 
independent variables," or "a is a constant," would count as the "hypotheses."  The 
second set of propositions, the "dictionary," supplies the theoretical concepts with an 
interpretation, or defines the theoretical variables and constants and their relations.  From 
these two sets of propositions taken conjointly, an empirical law may be deduced.  In a 
thought experiment intended to disprove the Duhemian, Campbell describes two 
examples of such "physical theories."  The first example is a set of mathematical 
propositions plus rules for their interpretation that he invents, from which he deduces a 
(fictional) phenomenal law.  The second is Boyle's theory of gases.  The first, he says, is 
not a theory at all:  "Any fool" he argues, "can invent a logically satisfactory theory to 
explain any law."(Campbell, 1920, p. 259)  What makes theory "satisfactory," according 
to Campbell, is that it displays an analogy.  A simple set of propositions alone, from 
which may be deduced a phenomenal law, does not provide an explanation.   
In order for a theory to be “valuable,” according to Campbell, its laws must 
"display an analogy" with some known laws.  Or, in order to understand some 
phenomenon in virtue of a theory, we have to understand the hypotheses of the theory in 
terms of some substantive analogy between the properties of the phenomena to be 
explained and the properties of some known system: as between the particles of a gas in 
motion and a number of infinitely small and highly elastic bodies contained in a cubical 
box.  A theory, to be explanatory, must provide an account of what mechanical properties 
are the causal basis of the system studied, not simply proffer logically connected 
propositions from which the phenomenal properties of a system may be deduced.  
According to Campbell, to think of analogies as mere aids to theory construction is 
misguided.  Analogies are absolutely essential to the theory being at all meaningful or 
explanatory: 
Analogy, so far from being a help to the establishment of theories, is the greatest 
hindrance.  It is never difficult to find a theory which will explain the laws 
logically; what is difficult is to find one which will explain them logically and at 
the same time display the requisite analogy.  Nor is it true that, once the theory is 
developed, the analogy becomes unimportant.  If it were found that the analogy 
were false it would at once lose its value; if it were presented to someone unable 
to appreciate it, for him the theory would have little value.  To regard analogy as 
an aid to the invention of theories is as absurd as to regard melody as an aid to the 
composition of sonatas. (Campbell, 1920, p. 130) 
 
Duhem and Campbell are illustrative of two extremes in the debate among 
philosophers of science in the 1950's and 60's over the role of models in science.  On the 
one hand, the understanding of what models are and how they function was viewed in the 
context of rational reconstruction of scientific theorizing as a deductive system.  A 
model, on this view, is simply another interpretation of the axioms of some theory, such 
that model and theory bear a formal relationship to one another in virtue of their common 
logical structure.  Philosophers such as Braithwaite, Nagel and Brodbeck thus contended 
that the concept of "model" in the empirical sciences may be understood in a single sense, 
akin to that given in mathematical logic.  On the other hand, philosophers such as Hesse, 
Achinstein, and Spector investigated the nature of analogical models and how they 
function in the context of how scientists in fact speak about and use models; i.e., their 
focus was on the practice of science, and the dynamics of scientific change.  
In Models and Analogies in Science, Hesse makes an important advance in the 
discussion by introducing a distinction between “positive,” “neutral” and “negative” 
analogies.  She constructs an imaginary debate between a Duhemian and a Campbellian.  
“When we take a collection of billiard balls as a model for a gas,” explains the 
Campbellian, “we are not asserting that billiard balls are in all respects like gas 
particles.”(Hesse, 1966, p. 8)  Positive analogies are just those properties of billiard balls, 
for instance, that we do want to ascribe to molecules in our statistical model of the 
properties of a perfect gas.  Negative analogies are those respects in which we take it that 
billiard balls do not resemble gases; for instance, properties such as “hard and shiny” are 
predicated of billiard balls but not of particles of a gas.  Neutral analogies are the most 
important aspects of a model; these are the respects for which we do not know whether or 
not the model and the system under study are positively or negatively analogous.  In the 
early stages of theory construction, most of the analogies will be “neutral”; that is, the 
respects in which the model is like the world are largely unknown.  As a theory advances, 
neutral analogies may be converted into positive or negative analogies.  In this respect, 
Hesse incorporates an appreciation of the dynamics of theory change that Nagel and 
Braithwaite lack.  In Hesse's view, the neutral analogy is “that feature of the model which 
are its growing points.”  Or, it is only in virtue of posited substantive similarities between 
the theoretical object and the model that a theory may suggest hypotheses, or suggest 
avenues for growth.   
I wish to suggest that appeal to “neutral” analogies in the history of biology were 
important aspects of their theoretical program.  Argument from analogy, where scientists 
make substantive identities between object modeled and the analogue, is a key tool in the 
process of generating predictions.  Assertion of mere formal analogy, or identity of 
structure between logical structure of the propositions of the theory and model, may not 
lead to novel, predictive, and theory-extending suggestions about the properties of the 
system under study in the same manner.  For this, assertions of substantive similarity 
between properties of the system modeled are required, or so Achinstein has argued:  
 
From an identity in logical form of two sets of statements , nothing can be 
inferred about the credibility of individual statements in one set from a knowledge 
of the truth of the statements in the other set.  For the credibility, or plausibility, 
of  set of postulates must be determined by an appeal to content and cannot be 
ascertained by reference to logical form alone.   
 
…. Those analogies in which objects are described having certain properties 
physically similar to properties of entities in the theory can provide a plausible 
foundation for additional theoretical postulates.  For if two types of objects are 
described as physically similar in certain respects this furnishes a basis for 
supposing that further similarities may be discovered.  Such reasoning constitutes 
an argument from analogy.(Achinstein, 1964, p. 347) 
 
 
Hesse, Achinstein and Spector thus argued that substantive analogies between properties 
of the system under study and of some other - often more familiar - system enable 
scientists to make predictions and extensions of theory.   
I take some of the key insights of these latter day proponents of analogy in the 
sciences to be the following:  
- Analogies may be false in some respects and true in others; in Hesse’s words, 
there are positive, negative and neutral respects in which our theory and 
analogue bear resemblances to one another.  It follows that there need not be a 
conflict in deploying two different analogies in our scientific description; 
while they may contradict one another in some respects, these respects are not 
necessarily the respects in which an analogue can be positive or neutral - the 
“growing points” of the theory. 
- Analogical thinking is not always merely heuristic, but is often intrinsically 
tied to the process of explanation and prediction in the sciences. 
- In light of the above, a theory may not be the same theory when stripped of its 
analogies. 
- There are no unique problems in the deployment of metaphor and analogy in 
the sciences.  Analogy is part and parcel of scientific descriptions. 
 
3.  Return to the Present Debate: 
 
In sum, there is no doubt that analogical thinking surely may lead scientists 
astray.  However, it may also lead to substantive predictions, tests, and advances in 
understanding.  It is often in virtue of posited substantive similarities between the 
theoretical object and the model that a theory is predictive.  Moreover, insofar as there 
are positive, negative and neutral respects in which our theory and analogue bear 
resemblances to one another, there need not be a conflict in deploying two different 
analogies in our scientific description; while they may contradict one another in some 
respects, these respects are not necessarily grounds for treating the theories as contrary. 
As a model of adaptive change within populations, the three dimensional 
landscape has historically been enormously useful.  Surely, it’s not clear that the fitness 
of whole populations is adequately represented in three dimensions.  Given the variety of 
different dimensions along which populations can change their genetic constitution, the 
three dimensional landscape is inadequate.  Nonetheless, Wright’s metaphor at least 
suggested a substantive analogy that could be tested, and was found wanting (e.g., for the 
case of speciation via peak shifting).  So, the landscape made possible tests of Wright’s 
presuppositions: that adaptive change required decline in fitness.  The positive, negative, 
and neutral features of the model are thus: 
 
Positive: Individual fitnesses may be mapped as a function of gene 
frequency. 
Negative: However, population fitnesses do not, in general, increase as a 
function of allele frequencies, fitness landscapes for whole populations are not 
static, and are multidimensional. 
Neutral: Exploring the multidimensional landscape could yield novel 
insights into speciation… 
 
Scientific representations are always representations only in some respect or to some 
degree.  The only difference between a mathematical representation (formalism) and the 
analogical model is that the former has explicit rule-based structure; certain inferences 
are licensed and not others as a matter of the form of the equations.  The value of a 
representative scheme is determined by its ability to support certain kinds of inferences; 
e.g. to support hypotheses and predictions that may be falsified.  Representations meet 
the epistemic aims of some domain and can come to shape these aims.  As a science 
makes progress, the representational framework determines which questions are worth 
asking and how one should go about investigating such questions. Success of a 
representation or explanation is thus a pragmatic matter; it is dependent on the aims of a 
particular community.  Thus, whether or not to regard the landscape as useful or 
problematic will hinge in part upon the aims of practitioners, and whether and how their 
attempts to generalize this framework lead to useful new predictions in new domains. 
In sum, there are at least four purported problems with Adaptive Landscapes: 
 
1. That the landscape is static, rather than changing. 
2. That populations in the vicinity of an adaptive peak will tend to “climb” to a new 
fitness optimum. Average population fitness can decrease.  As Moran (1964) 
pointed out, “populations do not in general tend to maximize their mean fitness if 
the latter is dependent on more than one locus” (i.e., most of the time).  Wright 
had to assume that relative fitnesses depend upon a single variable (the frequency 
of certain alleles), and that they do not change in time.  But, average population 
fitness frequently depends upon more than one variable that changes in time, e.g.  
the case of frequency dependent genotypic fitness.  Selection does not necessarily 
drive populations toward peaks of the landscape described by the mean fitness 
function.   
3. When fitnesses are frequency dependent, it is not necessarily possible to translate 
dynamic equations into a landscape that represents the force of selection. 
4. Generally speaking, the fitness of a whole population is not a direct function of 
the frequencies of genes in the population. 
 
However, there is a variety of positive ways in which the landscape metaphor 
influenced research in evolutionary biology.  For instance, the study of peak shifting and 
founder effect; using both a one-locus, two-allele models, and multilocus models, 
theoretical biologists have been able to demonstrate that the probability of stochastic 
transitions between fitness peaks (peak shifting via drift) is very low.   
In sum, the views of the Duhemians (Kaplan and Piglucci, as well as Provine) on 
the one hand, and the Campbellians (Skipper and Ruse) can be reconciled.  The metaphor 
does have a variety of disanalogies with the patterns and processes it was intended to 
illuminate.  However, these may usefully be “discharged” in the context of hypothesis 
testing and prediction.  The metaphor has been enormously fruitful at generating 
questions for further inquiry, and providing substantive hypotheses that have been subject 
to test.  Campbell, and his advocate, Hesse argued that what makes models and analogies 
useful was the dynamical character of theories; a theory is not static, but is always being 
extended and modified to account for new phenomena.  Without the analogy, the 
extensions will be limited.  The formal model gives one a framework to build upon, but 
the advantage of the analogy is that it provides a variety of not entirely rule-bound ways 
to extend and test the model.  
Fisher and Wright used different analogies to speak about the systems they 
studied, and their disagreements often took place in terms of the proper choice of 
analogy.  Their choice of analogy was in part governed by perceived similarities between 
properties of the two systems, informed by different background assumptions about the 
genetic structure of populations.  Without sufficient empirical knowledge about the 
genetic structure of populations, they used analogy to suggest different hypotheses.  
These analogies are now integrated into population genetic theory.  Surely, they have 
limitations and are being emended, but in the early stages of evolutionary theory, it was 
difficult to even conceive of evolving populations in population genetic terms without 
some sort of vision of the field of gene combinations – lumpy, holey, or what have you.  
Perhaps we do not need to choose. 
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